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Entering onto the Path of Inference:
Textualism and Contextualism
in the Bruton Trilogy
By DAVID ARAM KAISER*

Introduction

T

HE “NEW TEXTUALISM” associated with the interpretive theory
of United States Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia has generated
a large body of scholarly commentary, and many of Scalia’s own decisions have been scrutinized through the lens of this debate.1 One of
Scalia’s opinions that has not yet been so analyzed but that cries out
for such treatment is Richardson v. Marsh2 (“Richardson”), which is the
second of the United States Supreme Court’s Bruton trilogy of cases
consisting of Bruton v. United States3 (“Bruton”), Richardson, and Gray v.
* David Aram Kaiser, J.D., is a judicial staff attorney at the Supreme Court of
California who received his law degree from the University of California, Hastings College
of the Law, and a Ph.D. in English from the University of California at Berkeley. The views
expressed herein are solely those of the author. This Article does not purport to reflect the
views of the Court as a whole or any of its justices, and is based entirely on information
available to the public.
1. The main, and, in my opinion, the most theoretically sophisticated academic exegetist of Scalia’s textualism is William N. Eskridge, Jr., whose works I refer to frequently
below. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
235–45 (2d ed. 2006) [hereinafter ESKRIDGE, INTERPRETATION]; William N. Eskridge, Jr., The
New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621 (1990) [hereinafter Eskridge, New Textualism]; William N. Eskridge, Jr., Textualism, the Unknown Ideal?, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1509 (1998) [hereinafter Eskridge, Unknown Ideal].
Articles on the relationship between Scalia’s textualism and his judicial opinions include Bryan H. Wildenthal, The Right of Confrontation, Justice Scalia, and the Power and Limits
of Textualism, 48 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1323 (1991), and David M. Zlotnick, Justice Scalia and
His Critics: An Exploration of Scalia’s Fidelity to His Constitutional Methodology, 48 EMORY L.J.
1377 (1999).
More recent articles on the continuing influence of textualism include Jonathan T.
Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (2006), and Alexander Volokh,
Choosing Interpretive Methods: A Positive Theory of Judges and Everyone Else, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV.
769 (2008).
2. 481 U.S. 200 (1987).
3. 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
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Maryland4 (“Gray”).5 Bruton law focuses on whether a jury will find a
codefendant’s confession incriminating to a defendant at a joint trial,
even if the defendant’s name is redacted from the confession. This
Article traces the theoretical confusion that has arisen in Bruton law as
a result of Justice Scalia’s argument—first raised in his majority opinion in Richardson and subsequently elaborated in his dissenting opinion in Gray—that the trial court must base its interpretation of
whether the redacted confession is incriminating to the defendant
based only on the “face” of the text of the confession and need not
consider other information introduced at trial.6 Contra Scalia, as I argue below, the whole movement of modern literary theory has been
towards rejecting textual formalism and towards recognizing the central role of context in determining meaning. Indeed, as I trace below,
the evolution of Bruton doctrine from Richardson to Gray illustrates a
crisis of textual formalism that parallels the movement from New Criticism to Deconstruction in literary theory.
Prior commentary has been practically unanimous in criticizing
the confusion and uncertainty in Bruton doctrine that has followed the
Supreme Court’s decisions in Richardson and Gray.7 But prior commentary has failed to grasp that the fundamental problem with Bruton
4. 523 U.S. 185 (1998).
5. This trilogy of cases defines the redaction problem. The Supreme Court decided
another Bruton case, Cruz v. New York, 481 U.S. 186 (1987), unrelated to redaction. Cruz
holds that Bruton applies even when a defendant’s confession that would corroborate the
statement of the non-testifying codefendant confessor is admitted. Id. at 188, 193.
6. See infra Part II.C.
7. See Alfredo Garcia, The Winding Path of Bruton v. United States: A Case of Doctrinal
Inconsistency, 26 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 401, 402 (1988) (arguing that “the Court’s decisions
issued since Bruton have been marked by a lack of doctrinal consistency and by a steady
erosion of the fundamental values supporting the [S]ixth [A]mendment’s confrontation
clause”); Bryant M. Richardson, Casting Light on the Gray Area: An Analysis of the Use of Neutral Pronouns in Non-Testifying Codefendant Redacted Confessions under Bruton, Richardson,
and Gray, 55 U. MIAMI L. REV. 825, 843 (2001) (arguing that “Gray left unanswered, or
perhaps unclear the constitutionality of admitting non-testifying codefendant confessions
redacted” with neutral pronouns); Judith L. Ritter, The X Files: Joint Trials, Redacted Confessions and Thirty Years of Sidestepping Bruton, 42 VILL L. REV. 855, 923 (1997) (arguing that a
variety of redactions of the defendant’s identity, ostensibly justified under Richardson, are
“transparent and worthless disguises”); Benjamin E. Rosenberg, The Future of Codefendant
Confessions, 30 SETON HALL L. REV. 516, 549 (2000) (“Gray’s observation that it is not the
fact of, but the kind of, inferences that is important is opaque.”); Bryan M. Shay, Note, “So I
Says to ‘The Guy,’ I Says . . .”: The Constitutionality of Neutral Pronoun Redaction in Multidefendant Criminal Trials, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 345, 389 (2006) (arguing that the Bruton trilogy
has produced “too many standards, and none of them is clear enough to guarantee consistent application”). In my opinion, Ritter’s article, which was published just before Gray,
remains the strongest contribution to Bruton scholarship, and I draw on it frequently
below.
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doctrine after Richardson and Gray is that the incriminating on-theface-of-the-text standard is inherently contradictory. Analyzing Bruton
doctrine in the light of Scalia’s theoretical pronouncements about
textualism not only clarifies the problems in Bruton doctrine following
Richardson, but also reveals textualism’s theoretical flaws more strikingly than prior critiques. As I will argue, the central theoretical flaw
of Scalia’s textualism is that it seeks to restrict the consideration of
context to a limited number of “special” interpretive situations, rather
than acknowledging that context constitutes the inescapable horizon
of all meaning.8 Because Scalia sees no special contextual issue at
stake in the redacted confessions at issue in Bruton, he, consistent with
his textualist theory, feels free to ignore the role context plays in determining the meaning that a jury will find in them. But, with Bruton
doctrine, to ignore the role of context in considering the meaning a
jury will find in a codefendant’s statement is to completely undermine
the validity of the court’s determination of prejudice to the defendant
from the admission of that evidence.
In short, the core of Scalia’s textualism is eliminating context.
There are significant parallels therefore between Scalia’s desire, in
statutory interpretation, to remove the interpretive context provided
by legislative history and his desire, in Bruton doctrine, to remove the
context of other evidence produced at trial for evaluating prejudice to
the defendant. But, as I will argue, based on the lessons of literary
theory, eliminating context also eliminates the possibility of finding a
valid interpretation. This Article draws on the Scalian textualist debate
in legal theory and the analogous debate in literary theory to argue
that a complete rejection of Richardson’s facial incrimination standard
is necessary to restore any sort of coherence to Bruton doctrine. I conclude that, once the facial incrimination standard has been dispelled,
there remains no principled reason for excluding from Bruton analysis
the consideration of other evidence introduced at trial.

I.

The Interpretative Issue Raised by Bruton

A Bruton problem arises when a codefendant’s confession implicating the defendant is introduced into evidence at a joint trial.9 State8. For prior critiques of Scalia’s textualism for failing to consider the role of context,
see Paul E. McGreal, Slighting Context: On the Illogic of Ordinary Speech in Statutory Interpretation, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 325 (2004), and Patricia M. Wald, The Sizzling Sleeper: The Use of
Legislative History in Construing Statutes in the 1988-89 Term of the United States Supreme Court,
39 AM. U. L. REV. 277 (1990).
9. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 132 (1968).

\\server05\productn\S\SAN\44-1\SAN104.txt

98

unknown

Seq: 4

UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW

2-OCT-09

11:41

[Vol. 44

ments the codefendant makes in the confession about the defendant
are often incriminating to the defendant, but the prejudice from
these incriminating statements “cannot be dispelled by cross-examination if the co-defendant does not take the stand.”10 In Bruton, the Supreme Court held that it would violate a defendant’s rights under the
Confrontation Clause if a non-testifying codefendant’s confession implicating the defendant were admitted at a joint trial, even if the jury
was instructed to disregard that confession in determining the guilt or
innocence of the defendant.11 In reaction to the Bruton decision, prosecutors sought to admit a codefendant’s confession at a joint trial by
redacting the confession so that the non-confessor defendant was not
directly named.12 The problem then arose whether, despite the redaction, the jury would nonetheless figure out that the non-confessor defendant was implicated by the confession.
Bruton issues are raised at trial through in limine motions, by
which counsel for the non-confessor defendant seeks to exclude the
confession (or have the trials of the codefendants severed), and the
prosecution typically seeks to have it admitted in a redacted form in a
joint trial.13 The legal issue is whether the jury would find the redacted confession so “powerfully incriminating” to the non-confessor
defendant that a limiting instruction could not cure the prejudice.14
Resolving this legal issue depends, in turn, on how one would expect a
reasonable jury to interpret the redacted confession at issue.15 In effect, the court bases its analysis on the court’s own general assump10. Id. (quoting 34 F.R.D. 411, 419 (1964)). Of course, “[i]f the declarant codefendant invokes the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and declines to testify,
the implicated defendant is unable to cross-examine the declarant codefendant regarding
the content of the confession.” People v. Lewis, 181 P.3d 947, 976 (Cal. 2008). A codefendant’s extrajudicial statement implicating the defendant need not be excluded when the
codefendant testifies and is available for cross-examination. Nelson v. O’Neil, 402 U.S. 622,
629–30 (1971).
11. Bruton, 391 U.S. at 127–28, 135–37.
12. See infra Part III.B–D.
13. A pragmatic argument for limiting the analysis of Bruton prejudice to the “face” of
the confession is that the trial court typically rules on the admissibility of the confession
challenged under Bruton before other evidence has been presented at trial. See infra Part
III.E.4.
14. Bruton, 391 U.S. at 135–36.
15. Since Bruton issues are typically argued in pretrial motions prior to the empanelling of the jury, trial courts are justified in basing their analysis on hypothetical rather than
actual jurors. On a more fundamental level, as with many legal issues relating to jury instructions, the law traditionally makes assumptions based on the reasonable juror, even in
the face of empirical research that actual jurors may not correspond to such assumptions.
See Judith L. Ritter, Your Lips Are Moving . . . But the Words Aren’t Clear: Dissecting the Presumption that Jurors Understand Instructions, 69 MO. L. REV. 163 (2004).
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tions about interpretation. In Richardson, Scalia fundamentally
changed Bruton analysis by casting the account of interpretation in
textualist terms, namely, that the meaning of the confession should be
determined solely by the face of text, not in combination with other
evidence presented at trial.
By pronouncing a textualist theory of interpretation, Richardson
implicates one of the central theoretical oppositions in modern hermeneutics: textual formalism versus contextualism. Textual formalism
is any theory of interpretation that holds that the meaning of a text
can be determined solely by the meaning of the words alone, or, to
define it in the negative, any theory of interpretation that holds that
meaning can be determined without regard to context.16 Contextualism, to the contrary, holds that meaning always depends on context,
no matter how “plain” that meaning may appear. This Article recounts
how the opposition between textual formalism and contextualism has
been defined in the debates over Scalia’s “textualism” and in the remarkably similar debates in literary theory. The Article then uses these
theoretical concepts to illuminate the contradictions in Bruton doctrine following Richardson.

II.

Theories of Interpretation

A. Scalia’s Textualism
Scalia’s Tanner Lectures at Princeton University, published with
commentaries and a response by the author in A Matter of Interpretation, are the fullest theoretical expression of his textualism.17 The
backdrop of Scalia’s discussion is the proper relation of the AngloAmerican common-law tradition of judging to the modern body of
16. In literary theory, the term “formalism” usually stands for what I am calling “textual formalism.” See, e.g., Stanley Fish, Going Down the Anti-Formalist Road, in DOING WHAT
COMES NATURALLY: CHANGE, RHETORIC, AND THE PRACTICE OF THEORY IN LITERARY AND LEGAL STUDIES 1–33 (Duke Univ. Press 1989). In legal theory, the term “formalism” is often
used more broadly as an opposite to legal pragmatism or realism, and includes various
legal methodologies of which textual formalism is one, but not the sole, type. See, e.g., Cass
R. Sunstein, Must Formalism Be Defended Empirically?, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 636, 638–39 (1999).
Theories of legal formalism generally entail three commitments: “to promoting compliance with all applicable legal formalities . . . , to ensuring rule-bound law . . . , and to
constraining the discretion of judges in deciding cases.” Id. at 638.
17. ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW
(Princeton Univ. Press 1997). Richardson was decided in 1987, but A Matter of Interpretation
was not published until 1997. As discussed below, however, the full implications of Richardson are expressed in Scalia’s dissenting opinion in Gray, which was decided in 1998. Therefore, it is appropriate to criticize Scalia’s approach to Bruton prejudice in relation to his
mature theoretical pronouncements in A Matter of Interpretation.
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extensive federal statutory law. Scalia describes the common-law
courts as having two functions: (1) applying established law to facts,
and (2) making new law.18 As Scalia describes it, no rule of decision
previously announced could be erased, but a common-law judge
could create new law by distinguishing the facts of the current case
and enunciating a new principle of law based on those new facts.19
Because the facts of cases are seldom exactly similar in all respects,
there was no practical restraint on the ability of the common-law
judge to create new law by distinguishing prior cases.20 Scalia does not
directly criticize the quality of the body of law created by common-law
judges, whom he portrays as an aristocratic class essentially unaccountable to the will of the people.21 He does, however, argue that this individual and unaccountable method of common-law judging is
fundamentally incompatible with the modern era of legislation, in
which most new law is statutory.22 He concludes that another method
of judging is required, one that recognizes that the judge’s role is to
interpret the meaning of the text of the statute honestly, rather than
to create new law in the common-law style based on the judge’s personal belief about the just outcome of the case.23
Scalia also argues that the common-law method of judging is similarly inappropriate for determining federal constitutional issues.24
Scalia argues against what he sees as mistaken theories of a “dynamic”
Constitution that allow for a common-law way of making law to be
applied to constitutional issues.25 He argues that the purpose of the
Constitution is not to authorize the changing of constitutional rights
to reflect the changing times, but, rather, the Constitution’s purpose
is to “prevent change,” that is, “to embed certain rights in such a manner that future generations cannot readily take them away.”26 Scalia
uses the term “textualism” to describe the approach to judicial decision-making that upholds this conception of the Constitution.27
18. Id. at 6.
19. Id. at 8–9.
20. See id. at 7–11. Scalia acknowledges that the self-conception of the common-law
tradition was that it was discovering existing law rather than creating new law, but argues that
the work of legal realist scholarship in this century had shown that common law judges
were in fact creating new law. Id. at 10.
21. See id. at 9–12.
22. Id. at 12–13.
23. Id. at 13, 17–18.
24. Id. at 40.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 23–25.
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Through textualism, Scalia proposes that a text “should be construed reasonably, to contain all that it fairly means.”28 He denies he is
a “literalist,” and he acknowledges that “the principal determinant of
meaning is context.”29 However, he asserts that words “have a limited
range of meaning, and no interpretation that goes beyond that range
is permissible.”30 The principal change Scalia proposes to judicial
decisionmaking is that judges should give little or no consideration to
arguments based on legislative history in determining statutory meaning.31 He argues that “the objective indication of the words, rather
than the intent of the legislature, is what constitutes the law,”32 that
legislative history materials add nothing to determining the meaning
of the words, and that arguments based on them are therefore a timeconsuming waste of judicial resources.33
In contrast to his dismissal of the value of legislative history in
determining statutory meaning, Scalia will, however, consult the Federalist papers in interpreting the Federal Constitution. He states that he
consults the Federalist papers not in order to determine the intent of
the Framers of the Constitution—some of whom, of course, also wrote
the Federalist papers—but rather because, “like those of other intelligent and informed people of the time,” the Federalist papers “display
how the text of the Constitution was originally understood.”34
In response to Scalia’s textualism, a substantial and sophisticated
body of literature has developed around theories of interpretation for
statutory and constitutional texts. William N. Eskridge, Jr., who has
presented the most extensive theoretical explication of what he calls
Scalia’s “New Textualism,” characterizes Scalia’s approach as a sophisticated close scrutiny of the text and distinguishes this New Textualism from the traditional legal concept of “plain meaning.”35 Like
traditional “plain meaning” approaches, Scalia’s textualism starts with
the meaning an ordinary reading would draw from the text, but
Scalia’s textualism then delves deeper into what other textual sources
28. Id. at 23.
29. Id. at 24, 135.
30. Id. at 24.
31. Id. at 36.
32. Id. at 29.
33. Id. at 36–37.
34. Id. at 38. This reflects Scalia’s originalist approach to constitutional interpretation,
a topic too vast to be comprehensively treated here. For a recent extensive analytical survey
of theories of originalism, see Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1
(2009). A thorough examination of the complicated, and perhaps contradictory, relationship between Scalia’s textualism and his originalism is also beyond the scope of this article.
35. Eskridge, Unknown Ideal, supra note 1, at 1512.

R
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might indicate about the text’s meaning.36 For example, for statutory
interpretation, the Scalian interpreter applies the regular rules of
grammar, syntax, and word use to the text, but also considers which
interpretation is consistent with the statutes as a whole, whether similar language has been used elsewhere in the United States Code, and
if so, how it has been interpreted.37 These “structural” techniques of
interpretation, as Eskridge dubs it, involve close readings of texts,
which, as I discuss below in Part II.B, are similar to those associated
with the school of literary criticism known as the New Criticism.38 The
appeal of Scalia’s New Textualism is the same as that of literary New
Criticism. Both use a close scrutiny of the text, which reveals its complexities and nuances.39 But, as I will discuss below, both of them go
wrong in positing that close scrutiny can reveal the meaning determined by the “text itself,” which is independent of context.
The greatest controversy about Scalia’s textualism has focused on
his claim that legislative history is irrelevant to determining the meaning of statutes.40 Scalia argues against judges using the unexpressed intent of the legislature as reflected in legislative history as a substitute for
the statute as actually written.41 But he does not explain why legislative
history should not be considered as relevant contextual information
in determining the meaning of a statute as written.42 Such an approach
36. Id.
37. Id. In this way, all of the United States Code can be interpreted horizontally as one
text, as opposed to being interpreted vertically as a series of laws enacted at different times
with different legislative histories. See Eskridge, New Textualism, supra note 1, at 678–79.
38. For an account of structural arguments used in New Textual interpretation, see
Eskridge, New Textualism, supra note 1, at 660–63.
39. A striking parallel between literary New Criticism and Scalia’s New Textualism is
their appeal as a teachable method of interpretation. The close readings of New Criticism
were well suited to classroom instruction. Eskridge similarly describes how New Textualism
is well received by students. Eskridge, Unknown Ideal, supra note 1, 1513–14 n.16 (“Many
law students take to the new textualism like rats to a maze. Even some law students who
dislike most of the results Scalia reaches find his methodology potentially attractive.”).
40. See, e.g., id. at 1519; Ronald Dworkin, Comment, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION:
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW, supra note 17, 115–27. For an overview, see ESKRIDGE, INTERPRETATION, supra note 1, 238–45.
41. See SCALIA, supra note 17, at 29–37. As he states, “‘legislative intent’ divorced from
text” is a “subterfuge” for judges to impose their policy preferences. Id. at 22.
42. See ESKRIDGE, INTERPRETATION, supra note 1, at 310 (observing that “a further role
for consulting legislative history . . . especially for statutes adopted long ago,” is that “it is
instructive for the current interpreter to see how the legislators used statutory terms. . . .
Even a textualist might find something of value in legislative history, which might be a
more democratically legitimate guide to meaning than the commonly deployed dictionaries that so fascinate the current Supreme Court.”).

R
R
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appears completely analogous to Scalia’s own use of the Federalist papers to determine the “original” understanding of the Constitution.43
As I will turn to next, beyond the specific disputes in statutory
and constitutional interpretation, Scalia’s central theoretical claim is
that textualism is the only method that constrains interpretation.
Scalia’s textualism is based on the principle that the text itself can
dictate legitimate interpretation, or, at the least, that the text itself can
constrain illegitimate interpretation. Scalia regards contextual approaches to interpretation with suspicion because he sees them as allowing judges to ignore or alter the plain meaning of the text in order
to impose their own policy preferences.44 Eskridge summarizes this
central concern of textualism when he states: “Sometimes that context
will suggest a meaning at war with the apparent acontextual meaning
suggested by the statute’s language.”45 Consequently, Scalia wants to
restrict the use of context in interpretation to a limited set of “special”
situations.46 The main special situation is constitutional interpretation, where, reflecting his constitutional originalism, Scalia favors a
contextual analysis based on word usage in the eighteenth century.47
But, as discussed below, contextualism shows us that there is no
such thing as an “acontextual meaning.” As Stanley Fish points out,
setting forth an opposition between “acontextual” plain meaning, on
the one hand, and contextual meaning, on the other, is the first erro43. See SCALIA, supra note 17, at 38.
44. Scalia has noted:
When you are told to decide, not on the basis of what the legislature said, but on
the basis of what it meant, and are assured that there is no necessary connection
between the two, your best shot at figuring out what the legislature meant is to ask
yourself what a wise and intelligent person should have meant; and that will surely
bring you to the conclusion that the law means what you think it ought to mean—
which is precisely how judges decide things under the common law.
SCALIA, supra note 17, at 18. See also Eskridge, New Textualism, supra note 1, at 648.
45. Eskridge, New Textualism, supra note 1, at 621.
46. In addition to “the distinctive problem of constitutional interpretation,” Scalia
recognizes that cases of “scrivener’s error” are so “extreme” as to permit “giv[ing] the
totality of context precedence over a single word.” SCALIA, supra note 17, at 37, 20.
47. Id. at 38–39. See also Scalia’s recent opinion in District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S.
Ct. 2783 (2008), in which he engages in an extensive review of eighteenth century usage of
the phrase “bear arms” in order to support a conclusion about the meaning of these words
in the Second Amendment. Heller also illustrates the complicated relationship between
Scalia’s textualism and his constitutional originalism. The detailed historical approach
used by Heller would also be used by an interpreter seeking the framers’ original intent.
Fish, who relentlessly criticizes Scalia’s textualism, embraces Heller as an acknowledgement
that interpretation always implicitly involves determining authorial intent. Stanley Fish,
What Did the Framers Have in Mind?, NEW YORK TIMES, July 6, 2008, http://fish.blogs.ny
times.com/2008/07/06/what-did-the-framers-have-in-mind (last visited Aug. 6, 2009).
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neous step that theorists make in going down the formalist road.48
The central contextualist insight is that, for an interpreter to find any
meaning whatsoever in a text, that meaning will always already be situated within a framework of contextual information.49 What Eskridge
calls the apparent “acontextual” meaning of a text is always already a
contextualized meaning, although it might be one the interpreter understands without consulting obviously “outside” contextual information, such as legislative history materials.
Once one recognizes the fundamental theoretical mistake in trying to distinguish the “acontextual” plain meaning, on the one hand,
from “special” contextual meanings, on the other, one can, of course,
still meaningfully talk about different types of contextual information
and argue that some types of contextual information are more relevant than others for certain types of interpretation. One is still free to
make practical arguments for restricting the type of contextual information that should be considered by a court. For example, those who
advocate rejecting the use of legislative history materials for interpreting statutes can still make the practical argument that considering legislative history is a waste of time and resources because, so the
argument goes, in many cases the statutory history does not resolve
the legal question any more effectively than an analysis of the text
itself does.50 But advocates of rejecting legislative history cannot make
the theoretical argument that the text itself dictates an “acontextual”
plain meaning that the interpreter can choose over a contextual
meaning.
B. Literary New Criticism and Its Legacy
Scalia’s central concern with asserting the primacy of the text in
the face of the dangers of unconstrained interpretation echoes,
whether consciously or not, the debates associated with the “culture
wars” of the 1980s and 1990s in which Deconstruction was criticized
for undermining the meaning of the great works of the Western ca48. See Fish, supra note 16, at 1–33. Fish states that formalist thinking presupposes an
opposition between the literal and the metaphorical, the literal being understood as that
which is “direct, transparent, without difficulties, unmediated, independently verified, unproblematic, preinterpretive, and sure,” whereas the metaphorical is “indirect, opaque,
context-dependent, unconstrained, derivative, and full of risk.” Id. at 41.
49. See infra Part II.C.
50. See ESKRIDGE, INTERPRETATION, supra note 1, 244–45. As discussed below, for the
determination of Bruton prejudice, no such efficiency argument can be made for banning
the consideration of other evidence presented at trial, since this evidence is going to be
heard by the jury anyway.
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non of literature and philosophy.51 Indeed, Scalia’s depiction in A
Matter of Interpretation of the common-law judge as willfully creating
new law against the restraint of past precedents reminds one of the
“strong reader” postulated by Yale critic Harold Bloom, who willfully
misreads a literary work in the act of interpreting it.52 It is not surprising, however, that the debate over Scalia’s textualism parallels debates
in literary criticism. The crisis of meaning associated with Deconstruction turns on the question of how the “text itself” can dictate its own
interpretation. This question was first raised by the literary critical
movement called the “New Criticism,” whose emphasis on scrutinizing
the text itself to determine meaning shows striking parallels to Scalia’s
“New Textualism.”53
The New Criticism dominated Anglo-American literary studies
from roughly the 1930s through the 1970s.54 It used as its distinctive
method a “close reading” of the text, which scrutinized the language
and imagery of a work and explicated its internal tensions and multi51. See, e.g., ALLAN BLOOM, THE CLOSING OF THE AMERICAN MIND: HOW HIGHER EDUCAHAS FAILED DEMOCRACY AND IMPOVERISHED THE SOULS OF TODAY’S STUDENTS 379 (Simon & Schuster 1987) (“[Deconstructionism] is the last, predictable, stage in the
suppression of reason and the denial of the possibility of truth in the name of philosophy.
The interpreter’s creative activity is more important than the text; there is no text, only
interpretation.”). For a review of the impact of deconstruction on legal studies, see Stephen M. Feldman, An Arrow to the Heart: The Love and Death of Postmodern Legal Scholarship,
54 VAND. L. REV. 2351 (2001), and Peter C. Schanck, Understanding Postmodern Thought and
Its Implications for Statutory Interpretation, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 2505 (1992).
52. “[M]ost so-called ‘accurate’ interpretations of poetry are worse than mistakes; perhaps there are only more or less creative or interesting misreadings . . . .” HAROLD BLOOM,
THE ANXIETY OF INFLUENCE: A THEORY OF POETRY 43 (Oxford Univ. Press 1973).
53. Despite its prominence in literary interpretation, New Criticism is rarely mentioned in discussions of legal interpretation and has never, as far as I can tell, been discussed in connection with Scalia’s textualism. Judge Richard A. Posner, however, who
often applies literary analysis to the law, sometimes discusses New Criticism. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE 219–46 (Harv. Univ. Press 1998); see also William M.
Treanor, Taking Text Too Seriously: Modern Textualism, Original Meaning, and the Case of
Amar’s Bill of Rights, 106 Mich. L. Rev. 487, 488 n.2, 501-03 (2007) (criticizing Akhil Amar’s
close reading of the Bill of Rights as reflecting New Critical methods and assumptions);
Michael L. Boyer, Contract as Text: Interpretive Overlap in Law and Literature, 12 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 167, 171–75 (2003) (analyzing structural similarities between New Criticism
and Professor Williston’s conception of the parol evidence rule).
54. This timeline begins with the publication of William Empson’s Seven Types of Ambiguity in 1930 (New Directions Publ’g Corp.), an early seminal New Critical text, and ends
with the publication in 1974 of the English translation of Jacques Derrida’s Of Grammatology
(Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak trans., Johns Hopkins Univ. Press), which arguably signaled
the ascendance of deconstruction in literary studies. For an overview of the New Criticism,
see 6 RENÉ WELLEK, A HISTORY OF MODERN CRITICISM: 1750-1950, AMERICAN CRITICISM:
1900-1950 144–58 (Yale Univ. Press 1986).
TION
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ple meanings.55 Because New Criticism emphasized close readings, it
became associated with the idea that interpretation should be based
on the “text itself,” rather than on the historical context in which a
work was created or the apparent historical intention of the author.56
An example of a classic New Critical reading of a literary work is Cleanth Brooks’ reading of William Wordsworth’s, “A Slumber Did My
Spirit Seal.”57 Cleanth Brooks is widely acknowledged as one of the
most influential of the New Critics, and one of the seminal essays of
New Criticism is his “Irony as a Principle of Structure.”58 There he
presented a close reading of “A Slumber Did My Spirit Seal,” which is
one of Wordsworth’s so-called “Lucy” poems, a series of short lyrical
poems about a mysterious girl, or perhaps nature sprite, who grows up
in harmony with nature and then inexplicably dies.59 The poem describes the effect of her death on the narrator:
A slumber did my spirit seal;
I had no human fears:
She seemed a thing that could not feel
The touch of earthly years.
No motion has she now, no force;
She neither hears nor sees,
Rolled round in earth’s diurnal course,
With rocks, and stones, and trees.60

Brooks considered irony to be the distinctive feature of poetry,
and for him the word “irony” broadly connotes a “dynamic structure”
of a poem, a “pattern of thrust and counterthrust,” which is expressed
55. Cleanth Brooks and Robert Penn Warren popularized this approach in their textbook, UNDERSTANDING POETRY (1938). WELLEK, supra note 54, at 153. As Wellek puts it, the
New Critics believed in “the organicity of poetry” and in their readings constantly examined “attitudes, tones, tensions, irony, and paradox.” Id. at 151.
56. The New Critics reacted against and criticized the dominance of traditional academic historical scholarship. Id. at 148. They did not deny the value of historical background for interpretation, but they did insist that the act of interpretation must begin with
the particularities of the literary work. Id. at 148, 153.
57. I have adopted this reading from E. D. Hirsch’s influential article on contextualism in literary criticism, Objective Interpretation. E.D. Hirsch, Objective Interpretation, in CRITICAL THEORY SINCE PLATO 1100–15 (Hazard Adams ed., Harcourt 1992). Hirsch contrasts
readings of the poem by two literary critics, Cleanth Brooks and F. W. Bateson. Id. at
1108–09. Discussions of interpretation frequently cite this poem and its readings. See, e.g.,
POSNER, supra note 53, 233–34.
58. Cleanth Brooks, Irony as a Principle of Structure, in CRITICAL THEORY SINCE PLATO
968–74 (Hazard Adams ed., Harcourt 1992). For an overview of Brooks’ criticism, see WELLEK, supra note 54, at 188–213.
59. For an extensive analysis of the “Lucy” poems, see Geoffrey H. Hartman, WORDSWORTH’S POETRY: 1787–1814 157–162 (Harv. Univ. Press 1987).
60. WILLIAM WORDSWORTH, WORDSWORTH POETICAL WORKS 149 (Thomas Hutchinson
& Ernest de Selincourt eds., Oxford Univ. Press 1981).
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by the relationship between the language in parts of the poem.61 In
this poem, Brooks describes the ironic tension surrounding the word
“feeling” in the poem. He points to the optimism of the first stanza, in
which the phrase “She . . . could not feel / The touch of earthly years”
has a positive connotation. That is to say, Lucy appeared to be someone not affected by ordinary human aging or mortality. This contrasts
with the language of the second stanza, “She neither hears nor sees,”
in which her lack of “feeling” now connotes that she is an inanimate
object like the rocks, stones, and trees.62
Brooks closely scrutinizes the text of the poem and points out a
tension or irony between its first and second stanzas. Nevertheless,
while Brooks’ close reading draws attention to a possible tension in
the poem, the language alone does not decide the question of
whether the poem is ironic in the sense he describes. Whether one
sees a tension or irony in the poem depends on how one interprets
the narrator’s attitude towards nature. According to a purely materialistic view of nature, to be like the rocks and stones is to be an inanimate material object. If the narrator holds such a view, for Lucy to be
“rolled around” with objects understood to be as dead as stones implies a sad fate for her. On the other hand, the narrator might hold a
pantheistic view of nature, in which all of nature, even the rocks and
stones, are imbued with the spirit of the divine. Such a narrator might
see Lucy as still alive in some sense as a presence in nature.63
How one interprets the attitude of the narrator depends on the
kind of context one presupposes for the poem. The context the
reader presupposes may depend on any or all of the following, in ascending order of larger contextual frameworks: the other “Lucy”
poems, Wordsworth’s other poetry, Wordsworth’s biography, and the
religious or philosophical sentiments of his day.64 The point of this
example is that while it is crucial to carefully scrutinize the structure
and language of the text, the interpretation will not be determined by
the text itself, but by the text understood within a contextual frame-

61. Brooks, supra note 58, at 973.
62. Id. at 972–73.
63. This is the interpretation made by F. W. Bateson, who states: “The vague livingLucy of this poem is opposed to the grander dead-Lucy who has become involved in the
sublime processes of nature.” Hirsch, supra note 57, at 1108.
64. As Hirsch puts it, “The interpreter’s primary task is to reproduce in himself the
author’s ‘logic,’ his attitudes, his cultural givens, in short his world.” Id. at 1114.

R

R

\\server05\productn\S\SAN\44-1\SAN104.txt

108

unknown

Seq: 14

UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW

2-OCT-09

11:41

[Vol. 44

work.65 Such a contextual framework is, by definition, “outside of” or
“beyond” the four corners of the text itself. A close scrutiny of the
text, as done by a New Critic like Brooks, can reveal the possible meanings of a text. But rather than the text itself, it is the context in which
the reader places the text that determines how the reader interprets
it.
Under New Criticism, close readings explicating the complexities
and ambiguities of literary works became the mainstream of literary
criticism for several decades. By the late 1970s, however, New Criticism was eclipsed by Deconstruction as the dominant theoretical
movement in literary studies. Especially at the height of its influence,
Deconstruction was seen, both by its champions and its critics, as being a radical break from traditional literary studies.66 Despite this apparent break, Deconstruction carried on the New Critical enterprise
of text-centered close readings.67 What made Deconstruction seem so
radical was that it highlighted the epistemological consequences of
the ambiguities and irony that New Critical readings had long uncovered. Thus, for example, the influential Deconstructionist critic Paul
de Man argued that although New Criticism proclaimed an organic
unity to the text, the actual practice of close reading exploded the
unity of the text by revealing multiple and contradictory meanings.68
In this way, Deconstruction brought to a theoretical crisis the interpre65. Before New Criticism, biographical and other historical information were the primary interpretive context through which literature was viewed. See WELLEK, supra note 54,
at 188–213.
66. For a review of academic conflict over literary deconstruction, see Paul A. Bové,
Variations on Authority: Some Deconstructive Transformations of the New Criticism, in THE YALE
CRITICS: DECONSTRUCTION IN AMERICA 3-19 (Jonathan Arac, et al. eds., Univ. of Minn. Press
1983).
67. As Fish has noted:
[I]n fact deconstruction is no more or less than a particularly arresting formula of
principles and procedures that have been constitutive of literary and other studies
for some time. Indeed deconstruction would have been literally unthinkable were
it not already an article of faith that literary texts are characterized by a plurality
of meanings and were it not already the established methodology of literary studies to produce for a supposedly “great text” as many meanings as possible.
Fish, supra note 16, at 154–55; see also Bové, supra note 66, at 5 (“The authority and dissemination of deconstruction can be accounted for by seeing it as a transformation of the critical variation called ‘New Criticism.’”).
68. “As it refines its interpretations more and more, American criticism does not discover a single meaning, but a plurality of significations that can be radically opposed to
each other. Instead of revealing a continuity affiliated with the coherence of the natural
world, it takes us into a discontinuous world of reflective irony and ambiguity.” Paul de
Man, Form and Intent in the American New Criticism, in BLINDNESS AND INSIGHT: ESSAYS IN THE
RHETORIC OF CONTEMPORARY CRITICISM 28 (2nd ed. Univ. of Minn. Press 1983).
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tive issue that had been raised by New Criticism, namely, how meaning was produced by “the text itself.”69 From the perspective of the
theoretical debates in literary studies, there is a certain irony to
Scalia’s appeal to the text itself as the solution to the problem of legal
interpretation. As the experience of New Criticism and Deconstruction has shown, close scrutiny of the text, on its own, will produce
multiple interpretations and will not settle the question of which interpretation is the correct one.
C. Contextualism
Alongside the New Critical and deconstructive emphasis on producing a multiplicity of readings, there arose attempts to define how
one might distinguish a valid reading from an invalid one through the
recognition of the central role context plays in determining meaning.70 Such “contextualists” include E. D. Hirsch, Steven Knapp, Walter Benn Michaels, and, most influentially for legal interpretation,
Stanley Fish.71
As discussed above, Scalia holds that texts display an “acontextual” plain meaning. Supporting this premise is the argument that, if
there were no such thing as an “acontextual” plain meaning, all texts
would be rendered ambiguous and would be open to any meaning
that an interpreter might wish to impose on them. As discussed above,
some Deconstructionists denied the existence of plain meaning and
celebrated the idea that all texts are inherently ambiguous. A contextualist like Fish, however, rejects the idea that one can either accept or
reject the “acontextual” plain meaning of a text. Fish rejects the whole
notion of “acontextual” meaning because he asserts the fundamentally contextual nature of all meaning:
[S]entences never appear in any but an already contextualized
form, and a sentence one hears as ambiguous (for example, “I like
69. Thus, Posner describes one aspect of Deconstruction as “a style of textual interpretation far wilder than anything dreamed of by the New Critics but recognizable as an
extension of New Criticism by its fascination with the extravagant ambiguities of meaning
that emerge when a text is inspected minutely, obsessively, with little regard for stabilizing
contextual features.” Richard A. Posner, What Has Modern Literary Theory to Offer Law?, 53
STAN. L. REV. 195, 205 (2000).
70. See David Kaiser & Paul Lufkin, Deconstructing Davis v. United States: Intention and
Meaning in Ambiguous Requests for Counsel, 32 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q., 737, 742–48 (2005).
71. Fish’s work has also been associated with the terms “postmodern pragmatism” and
“neopragmatism.” Schanck, supra note 51, at 2539–73. I use the term contextualism because it makes the contrast with textualism clearer. Furthermore, the term “pragmatism” in
legal studies is often associated with instrumentalist accounts of judging. See Sunstein, supra
note 16, at 638–39.
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her cooking”) is simply a sentence for which one is imagining, at
the moment of hearing, more than one set of contextual circumstances. Any sentence can be heard in that way, but there are conditions under which such imaginings are not being encouraged
(although they are still possible), and under these conditions any
sentence can be heard as having only a single obvious meaning.
The point is these conditions (of ambiguity and straightforwardness) are not linguistic, but contextual or institutional.72

Contextualism acknowledges that the same text can have different meanings in different contexts. But contextualism does not therefore conclude that the text is inherently ambiguous and without
meaning. Because the interpreter is always already situated in a context, the interpreter will always find a determinate meaning in the
text. Indeed, as Fish points out in the above quotation and throughout his whole body of criticism, an interpreter cannot get outside of
being contextually situated even if he or she tried.73 Consequently,
contextualism rejects the premise, held by both Deconstruction and
textualism, that the consequence of rejecting the existence of acontextual plain meaning is that the interpreter will be left without any
determinate meaning because he or she will face limitless possible
meanings in interpreting a text.74
The contextualist, no less than the textualist, can share the goal
of making the correct interpretation of a text. Thus, Fish acknowledges that the central concern of legal hermeneutics is “that there be
a constraint, something that allows us to say there are right and wrong
interpretations,” and asserts that “[i]nterpretation cannot be a rational activity in the absence of such a constraint.”75 But contextualism asserts that interpretive constraint cannot be based merely on a
scrutiny of “the text itself.” As the movement from New Criticism to
Deconstruction illustrates, scrutinizing the text without regard to context merely generates possible readings and leaves the interpreter
without any basis for asserting the validity of one interpretation over
another. The analysis of the short lyrical poem by Wordsworth showed
that an argument about interpretation is not about the words them72. Fish, supra note 16, at 129.
73. Thus, one commentator describes Fish’s work as epitomizing “metamodernism.”
See Feldman, supra note 51, at 2376. “Metamodernists tend to emphasize our situatedness:
we are always situated in a communal or cultural context.” Id. at 2374.
74. For a review of deconstructionist arguments in legal theory that posit there is no
way to distinguish a valid from an invalid interpretation because a text has an unlimited
number of possible meanings, see Jack M. Balkin, Deconstruction’s Legal Career, 27 CARDOZO
L. REV. 719, 727 (2005).
75. Stanley Fish, Intention Is All There Is: A Critical Analysis of Aharon Barak’s Purposive
Interpretation in Law, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1109, 1114 (2008).
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selves, but rather the implicit circumstantial contexts that one accepts
for those words.
The intention of the author is one of the central contextual circumstances determining meaning (if not the central one). That is to
say, whenever a reader finds meaning in a text, the reader implicitly
presupposes a hypothesis about what the author intended to communicate in that text.76 This is the position taken by Knapp and Michaels
in their article, Against Theory,77 which has been endorsed and characterized by Fish in legal interpretation as “intentional originalism.”78
Intentionalist interpretation is frequently misunderstood as requiring
meaning to be based on the determination of the actual psychological
state of the author, which, as critics are eager to point out, is fundamentally unknowable.79 Such objections, however, confuse the issue
of the determination of the actual psychological state of the author
with the interpretive concept that the recognition of meaning in any
text implicitly presupposes an authorial intention to communicate
that meaning.80 Thus, the intentionalist theory of meaning is a subset
of contextualism.81
76. For example:
The array of possibilities [of meaning] only begins to become a more selective
system of probabilities when, instead of confronting merely a word sequence, we
also posit a speaker who very likely means something. Then and only then does
the most usual sense of the word sequence become the most probable or “obvious” sense.
Hirsch, supra note 57, at 1107.
77. Steven Knapp & Walter Benn Michaels, Against Theory, in AGAINST THEORY: LITERARY STUDIES AND THE NEW PRAGMATISM 11–30 (W. J. T. Mitchell ed., Univ. of Chi. Press
1985).
78. Fish, supra note 75, at 1109, 1111 n.9.
79. For a review of traditional intentionalist approaches to statutory construction, see
ESKRIDGE, INTERPRETATION, supra note 1, at 221–30.
80. For example:
The assertion that the act of interpreting is always and necessarily the act of determining intention is not the answer to the question “What is going on in the interpreter’s mind?”—a question that would require research into brain waves,
cognitive processes, institutional practices, and much more. Rather, it is the answer to the question “What must be the case—what must we presuppose—if notions like agreement, disagreement, error, correction, and revision—are to make
any sense?”
Stanley Fish, There Is No Textualist Position, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 629, 647 (2005).
81. For a detailed account of Steven Knapp’s and Walter Benn Michaels’ intentionalist theory of meaning, see Kaiser & Lufkin, supra note 70, at 742–47. Even those, like Fish,
who advocate the intentionalist theory of meaning, acknowledge that there are additional
considerations involved with texts such as statutes that, being the result of the legislative
process, have, in some sense, multiple authors. See Fish, supra note 80, at 648. For an overview of approaches to determining legislative intent through legislative history, see ESKRIDGE, INTERPRETATION, supra note 1, at 303–22.
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Scalia criticizes contextualist approaches, such as a consideration
of legislative history, as allowing the interpreter to manipulate the
meaning of the text. To the contrary, removing a text from its context
is what allows invalid interpretation.82 For Bruton doctrine, ignoring
the essential role of context means ignoring the actual meaning a jury
will find in the codefendant’s confession, which is at the heart of the
inquiry into possible prejudice to the defendant. In the next sections,
I will make the following contextualist critique of Bruton doctrine:
since Gray, the central issue for Bruton analysis is whether a jury would
find a redacted confession to be immediately or obviously incriminating to a defendant. However, what a jury finds to be immediately or
obviously incriminating is not a built-in feature of the text of the confession itself, but rather a function of the contextual circumstances in
which the jury encounters the confession. Richardson, however, introduced a facially incriminating standard for Bruton analysis, which limited it to the four corners of the text and allowed trial courts to ignore
the essential role of contextual information in making determinations
of whether a defendant is incriminated by a confession. In Gray, the
Supreme Court recognized that a jury would always draw “inferences”
about a redacted confession based on the circumstances surrounding
it. Thus, Gray implicitly acknowledged that some consideration of context is always involved in Bruton analysis. But despite its implicit acknowledgment of the centrality of context, Gray retained Richardson’s
facial incrimination standard. The result is that Bruton analysis has
been left in a confused and contradictory state.

III.

Bruton Doctrine

A. Bruton v. United States
Bruton dealt with two codefendants, Bruton and Evans, who were
jointly tried and convicted by a jury in federal district court on a federal charge of armed postal robbery.83 At trial, a postal inspector testified that Evans orally confessed to him that Evans and Bruton
committed the armed robbery.84 Evans did not testify at trial.85 The
trial judge instructed the jury that although Evans’ confession was
82. See ESKRIDGE, INTERPRETATION, supra note 1, at 240 (acknowledging that “it is
mildly counterintuitive” that statutory interpretation based on more contextual information, such as a review of legislative history, leaves a court with more interpretive discretion
than an approach such as textualism, which is based on less contextual information).
83. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 123 (1968).
84. Id.
85. Id. at 136.
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competent evidence against Evans, it was inadmissible hearsay against
Bruton and therefore had to be disregarded in determining Bruton’s
guilt or innocence.86 The Supreme Court reversed Bruton’s conviction, holding that his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation had
been violated by the admission of Evans’ confession incriminating
Bruton, notwithstanding the trial court’s instruction to the jury about
the limited way it could use the confession.87 The Court reasoned
that, although one can reasonably expect juries to follow instructions,
“there are some contexts in which the risk that the jury will not, or
cannot, follow instructions is so great, and the consequences of failure
so vital to the defendant, that the practical and human limitations of
the jury system cannot be ignored.”88 Such a context is presented
when “the powerfully incriminating extrajudicial statements of a codefendant, who stands accused side-by-side with the defendant, are deliberately spread before the jury in a joint trial.”89
In light of the later developments in Bruton doctrine, it is useful
to note the issues Bruton left open. The confession of Bruton’s codefendant Evans, about which the postal inspector testified, referred to
Bruton by name or otherwise expressly identified him to the jury.90
There was therefore no question that the confessor’s statement “inculpat[ed] the nonconfessor” and that it was “powerfully incriminating.”91 Bruton noted that some lower court cases had sought to avoid
violating a defendant’s rights in Bruton-type cases by requiring the deletion of references to codefendants in a confessor’s statement.92 The
Bruton court, however, did not reach the issue of whether deletion in
and of itself would prevent the violation of the defendant’s Confrontation Clause rights.93 It was left to the next two cases of the Bruton
trilogy to explain when a deletion or redaction of a reference to a
non-confessor defendant was or was not sufficient to prevent the in86. Id.
87. Id. at 126. In doing so, the Supreme Court overturned its earlier ruling in Delli
Paoli v. United States, 352 U.S. 232 (1957). For a detailed account of the background to
Bruton, see Ritter, supra note 7, at 862–68.
88. Bruton, 391 U.S. at 135.
89. Id. at 135–36.
90. Id. at 124 n.1 (noting that the confession expressly implicated Bruton).
91. Id. at 126, 135.
92. Id. at 134 n.10.
93. Id. The Supreme Court did note that in Bruton’s case, the confession was offered
in evidence through the oral testimony of the postal inspector, and that even if a witness in
such a situation were instructed to delete references to the non-confessor defendant, he or
she was likely to accidentally slip up and mention the non-confessor defendant. Id. Typically, Bruton redaction cases deal with confessions that are presented in written form to the
jury.
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crimination of the non-confessor defendant. Bruton also left open the
factors the court could consider in determining whether a codefendant’s confession “powerfully incriminated” the defendant, including
the contextual information provided by other evidence introduced at
trial. In fact, it was the majority opinion in Richardson, penned by Justice Scalia, which introduced a textualist model for Bruton analysis and
limited it to what could be determined from the face of the
confession.
B. Between Bruton and Richardson
Nineteen years elapsed between the Bruton decision in 1968 and
the second case in the trilogy, Richardson, which was decided in
1987.94 During this time, lower courts took different approaches to
what came to be known as “contextual implication” analysis.95 Contextual implication analysis became important because many Bruton issue
cases involved situations in which the prosecution sought to use confessions at joint trials where the references to the nonconfessor defendant had been “redacted,” that is, deleted or otherwise altered.96
Contextual implication examines a redacted confession in the context
of all of the evidence admitted at trial.97 One commentator provides a
useful hypothetical to explain the method: Suppose a prosecutor has
the written confession of Dick where he wrote that, after eating lunch
at a pizza parlor with Jane, he and Jane robbed the bank next door.98
At the joint trial of Dick and Jane, Dick’s confession is introduced as
evidence, but all references to Jane’s name in the text are replaced
with “a friend.” However, other evidence at trial establishes that Jane
ate lunch with Dick at the pizza parlor next door to the bank the day
of the robbery. Under contextual implication analysis, a court would
find Bruton error even though Jane is not directly named in the confession, because the other information at trial provides a context by
which the confession incriminates Jane. In the years between Bruton
and Richardson, the United States Courts of Appeals were divided over
using contextual implication analysis.99 It is against this background
94. My account of this period draws on the excellent account in Ritter, supra note 7,
at 872–76.
95. See Richardson v. March, 481 U.S. 200, 206 (1987). Cases have also used the
phrase “evidentiary linkage analysis.” Id.
96. Following the case law and scholarship, I will use the term “redacted” as the general term for any change made in a Bruton confession.
97. Ritter, supra note 7, at 874.
98. This hypothetical and analysis is adopted from Ritter, supra note 7, at 873–75.
99. See id. at 876, and the cases cited therein at notes 131–32.
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that Justice Scalia in Richardson promulgated an anti-contextual,
“facially incriminating” standard for the analysis of Bruton prejudice.
C. Richardson v. Marsh
1. Facts and Holding
It is necessary to describe the facts of Richardson in some detail
because they are unusual for a Bruton case. Three individuals, Clarissa
Marsh, Benjamin Williams, and Kareem Martin, were charged with
the assault of Cynthia Knighton, and the murder of her four-year-old
son, Koran, and her aunt, Ollie Scott.100 Marsh and Williams were
jointly tried (as Martin was a fugitive at the time).101 At trial, Knighton
testified that Marsh, Williams, and Martin came to Scott’s house looking for money that they believed Scott had in her possession from
some previous criminal activity.102 Unfortunately, the Knightons happened to be visiting Scott when the three arrived.103 Armed with guns,
Martin and Williams forced Scott to locate the money.104 Marsh
watched over the Knightons and, at one point, prevented their escape.105 After Martin and Williams obtained what they were looking
for from Scott, they forced Scott and the Knightons into the basement
where Martin shot them; only Cynthia Knighton survived.106
In addition to Knighton’s testimony, the State introduced, over
the objection of codefendant Marsh, a confession that Williams gave
shortly after his arrest.107 His confession was redacted so that only the
activities of Williams and Martin were described.108 There was no reference to a third perpetrator in the confession, let alone any direct or
indirect reference to Marsh.109 Williams’ redacted confession largely
corroborated Knighton’s account of what Williams and Martin did at
the house.110 His confession also recounted a conversation Williams
had with Martin as they drove to the Scott’s house, in which Martin
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Richardson, 481 U.S. at 202.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 203.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 204.
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said he would have to kill the victims after the robbery.111 Williams did
not testify at trial.112
Codefendant Marsh testified in her own defense.113 She claimed
she had no prior knowledge that Martin or Williams were planning to
rob or kill the victims, and she thought the purpose of the visit to
Scott was to ask her for a loan.114 She testified she was too scared to
leave once the robbery began.115 Her testimony indicated that she
rode to Scott’s house in the same car as Martin and Williams, and she
was aware that they were talking, but could not hear their conversation over the sound of the radio.116
During his closing argument, the prosecutor admonished the
jury not to use Williams’ confession against Marsh.117 Despite this admonishment, later in his argument he linked Marsh to the part of
Williams’ confession that described his conversation with Martin in
the car.118 The prosecutor argued that Marsh’s testimony about not
hearing any of the conversation between Williams and Martin was implausible and that, if she had indeed heard that conversation, she was
aware of the plan to rob and kill the victims and was therefore an
accomplice.119 After closing argument, the trial court again instructed
the jury that Williams’ confession was not to be considered against
Marsh.120 The jury convicted Marsh of two counts of felony murder in
the perpetration of an armed robbery and one count of assault with
intent to commit murder.121
Marsh sought federal habeas corpus relief and prevailed in the
Sixth Circuit, which reversed her conviction.122 The Sixth Circuit held
that, in analyzing “whether Bruton bars the admission of a nontestifying codefendant’s confession, a court must assess the confession’s ‘inculpatory value’ by examining not only the face of the confession, but
also all of the evidence introduced at trial.”123 The Sixth Circuit noted
that the confession’s account of the conversation in the car was the
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 205.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 205–06 (citing Marsh v. Richardson, 781 F.2d 1201, 1212 (6th Cir. 1986)).
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only direct evidence that Marsh knew, before entering Scott’s house,
about the plan to rob and kill the victims, and that Marsh’s testimony
at trial had placed her in the same car in which the confession described the incriminating conversation.124
Scalia, writing for the majority in Richardson, reversed the Sixth
Circuit and held “the Confrontation Clause is not violated by the admission of a nontestifying codefendant’s confession with a proper limiting instruction when, as here, the confession is redacted to eliminate
not only the defendant’s name, but any reference to his or her existence.”125 The Court acknowledged, however, that the effect of the
limiting instructions might have been undone by the prosecutor’s
comments during closing argument urging the jury to use Williams’
confession in evaluating Marsh’s case.126 Thus, the case was remanded
for determination of whether, in light of Marsh’s failure to object to
the prosecutor’s comments, the prosecutor’s error could serve as the
basis for granting a writ of habeas corpus.127
2. The Facial Incrimination Standard
The Bruton issue in Richardson was unusual because it dealt with a
“complete redaction” confession; that is, not only Marsh’s name, but
also any mention of her existence had been removed from the confession. Also unusual for a Bruton case was that Marsh performed no actions in the unredacted confession. The only incriminating fact in the
unredacted confession was her mere presence in the car, which supported accomplice culpability based on her being aware that her companions planned to rob and kill the victims. As discussed below, in
most Bruton cases the incriminating effect of the confession arises precisely because the actions of a defendant are described in the redacted
confession, although his or her name is hidden. In a footnote, the
Richardson majority acknowledged that “we express no opinion on the
admissibility of a confession in which the defendant’s name has been
replaced with a symbol or neutral pronoun.”128
Even though Richardson’s holding was only applicable to completely redacted confessions, Richardson radically re-characterized all
of Bruton analysis by introducing the concept of “facial incrimination.”
Richardson characterized Bruton as holding that “a defendant is de124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id. at 206.
Id. at 211.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 211 n.5.
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prived of his Sixth Amendment right of confrontation when the
facially incriminating confession of a nontestifying codefendant is introduced at their joint trial, even if the jury is instructed to consider
the confession only against the codefendant.”129 However, the concept of facial incrimination was not central to the original Bruton decision. In retrospect, one could describe the confession at issue in
Bruton as being facially incriminating in the sense that Bruton was apparently “expressly” named in it.130 But this does not mean that the
original Bruton decision was limited only to cases in which the confession facially incriminates a defendant.131 By casting Bruton prejudice
in terms of “facial incrimination,” Richardson presupposes its conclusion that Marsh was not prejudiced because “the confession was not
incriminating on its face, and became so only when linked with evidence introduced later at trial (the defendant’s own testimony).”132
Using this logic, no fully redacted confession, as was at issue in Richardson, could ever “facially incriminate” a defendant because by definition a fully redacted confession has nothing on its face that incriminates
the defendant. That is to say, there is no word or symbolic signifier,
like an “X” or blank space, within the four corners of the text pointing
an accusatory finger at the defendant.
Responding to the dissent, the Richardson majority asserted that it
was not assuming that Williams’ confession did not prejudice Marsh
simply on the basis that she was not directly named in the confession.133 Rather, the Richardson majority argues that Marsh was not
prejudiced both because she was not directly named and because the
court issued a limiting instruction on the use of the confession.134
Thus, the Richardson majority characterizes its disagreement with the
dissent as not being about “whether the confession incriminated respondent” but rather about “whether the trial court could properly
assume the jury did not use it against her.”135 Richardson draws a distinction between the types of incriminating information for which a
limiting instruction can be expected to be effective.136 The Court
129. Id. at 207.
130. See Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 124 n.1 (1968) (noting that the confession expressly implicated Bruton).
131. Richardson, 481 U.S. at 217 n.4 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that “the dissenting
opinion in Bruton did not regard the Court’s decision as limited to codefendant confessions expressly implicating the defendant”).
132. Id. at 208 (majority opinion).
133. Id. at 208 n.3.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 208.
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found that “[s]pecific testimony that ‘the defendant helped me commit the crime’ is more vivid than inferential incrimination, and hence
more difficult to thrust out of mind.”137 With such explicit statements,
the Court noted:
[T]he only issue is, plain and simply, whether the jury can possibly
be expected to forget it in assessing the defendant’s guilt; whereas
with regard to inferential incrimination the judge’s instruction may
well be successful in dissuading the jury from entering onto the
path of inference in the first place, so that there is no incrimination to forget.138

Richardson also justifies its holding on the pragmatic ground that extending the Bruton exception to the assumed efficacy of limiting instructions to anything beyond facially incriminating statements would
have the result of requiring separate rather than joint trials in many
cases, and this, in turn, would impair both the efficiency and the fairness of the criminal justice system.139
By limiting Bruton analysis to the face of the text and excluding
consideration of other evidence introduced at trial, Scalia’s approach
in Richardson reflects the privileging of the text expressed in A Matter
of Interpretation. Richardson privileges the face of the text over evidence
outside the text on the ground that the former incriminates directly
while the later only incriminates inferentially. But, just as contextualist
analysis undercuts Scalia’s pronouncements in A Matter of Interpretation, it also undercuts the distinction Richardson draws between textual
incrimination and incrimination by inference. Contextualism reveals
the problems of trying to distinguish what meanings are “inside” or
“outside” the face of the text. What a text means depends on its context, and context necessarily includes information “outside” the four
corners of the text. In fact, even instances of “direct naming” presuppose a context outside the face of the text.
Stevens’ dissent criticized Richardson’s shifting of Bruton analysis
to the issue of whether the confession contained the name of the de137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 208–09. The Richardson majority is undoubtedly correct that, from the pragmatic perspective of legal efficiency, a narrower interpretation of Bruton is likely to allow
more joint trials than a more expansive interpretation of Bruton. But the Richardson dissent
points to the fundamental legal point that it would be too high a price to pay to trade the
“fundamental principles of constitutional liberty” to “secure greater speed, economy and
convenience in the administration of the law.” Id. at 218 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting
People v. Fisher, 164 N.E. 336, 341 (N.Y. 1928)). Since this article analyzes the ramifications of Scalia’s textualism to Bruton doctrine, I focus on the legal arguments in Richardson
rather than its pragmatic announcements.
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fendant. Stevens correctly notes that, “Bruton has always required trial
judges to answer the question whether a particular confession is or is
not ‘powerfully incriminating’ on a case-by-case basis; they should follow the same analysis whether or not the defendant is actually named
by his or her codefendant.”140 Stevens thus correctly points out that
the formal feature of direct naming does not, in itself, constitute
“powerful incrimination” under Bruton. Being named within the confession is only one factor to be considered in determining whether a
confession is powerfully incriminating. Indeed, as Stevens notes, “I
have no doubt that there are some codefendant confessions that expressly mention the defendant but nevertheless need not be excluded
under Bruton because they are not prejudicial.”141
The Richardson dissent also questions Scalia’s assertions that incrimination based on the face of the confession is different in kind
from incrimination gained inferentially, and that limiting instructions
are sufficient to prevent inferential incrimination because they prevent the jury from going down “the path of inference.” Stevens trenchantly notes: “If we presume, as we must, that jurors give their full and
vigorous attention to every witness and each item of evidence, the very
acts of listening and seeing will sometimes lead them down ‘the path
of inference.’”142 Stevens is correct, but the case against Richardson’s
textualism can and should be made more broadly. Not only will the
very acts of listening and seeing sometimes lead the jury down the path
of inference, they will always lead them down the path of inference.
Making such inferences is part and parcel of placing language in context, which is involved in any instance of interpretation, including instances of direct naming.
Richardson draws a distinction between instances in which the defendant is named in the confession and those in which the jury has to
“enter onto the path of inference” to discover the identity of the defendant. The validity of this distinction depends on the premise that
direct naming is somehow inference-free, and that direct naming provides the jury with meaning that involves nothing outside the face of
the text. But, as discussed above, a reader’s interpretation of a text
always involves the presupposition of a context within which the text
has meaning; that is, the interpreter always assumes some body of
background information.143 This is true even when a defendant is di140.
141.
142.
143.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See

at 214 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
at 214 n.2.
at 213.
supra Part II.C.
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rectly named in a confession. Suppose the defendant is named John
Smith, and John Smith is directly named in the confession. As direct
as this seems, the jury will only find this naming incriminating after it
engages in a series of “inferences,” by which it applies information
from outside the face of the text of the confession. For example, the
juror/interpreter will rely at least on the following facts outside the
face of the text: the juror is serving on a trial, and, in this trial, one of
the defendants is named John Smith.
One might object that such background facts are so obvious that
they go without saying. Admittedly, these background facts are obvious, and normally we would not make the effort to specify them. We
do not usually appreciate the importance of such background information until we are reminded that, given a different context, the same
words can take on a different meaning. For example, recall Fish’s example of the potential ambiguity of the sentence, “I like her cooking.”144 Under “ordinary” circumstances, one would interpret this to
mean that the speaker is fond of the food this woman makes. However, the sentence takes on a new meaning if we know that the speaker
is an old-fashioned sexist who believes that a woman’s place is in the
home. Given such a context, the sentence could mean “I like her when
she is cooking,” that is, the speaker implies that she should be cooking
rather than working outside the home. What if we know the speaker is
a cannibal? The sentence could mean “I like her being cooked.” Contextualism reminds us that when the meaning of words appears obvious,
it is not because the meaning of the words is context-free, but rather
because the interpreter encounters the words within a certain context
that makes them appear obvious. Change the context, and the same
“obvious” words suddenly offer a different meaning.
Whether a jury interprets a confession as incriminating to the
non-confessor defendant is likewise based on the context in which the
jury encounters the text. In a trial in which the indictment lists John
Smith as one of the defendants, a jury will find it obvious that the John
Smith named in the confession is the same one they see before them
in court. Once again, this background information is so obvious that
the jury’s underlying inference appears not to involve an inference at
all. But it is an inference nonetheless, as can be seen from the number
of possible circumstances in which the same inference could be false.
For example, the inference could be false if there were two different

144. Fish, supra note 16, at 129.

R
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individuals named John Smith involved in the crime, and the one in
court is not the one mentioned in the confession.
Background information and inference can therefore come into
play even when the inferences seem obvious, and this includes instances of direct naming. Contra Richardson, there is no hard and fast
line between “direct” and “indirect” naming. Context determines what
seems “direct” in any particular instance.145 John Smith is a very common name. Let’s consider another example, the slightly less common
name, John Lee Smith. Everyone would agree that the use in the confession of the defendant’s full legal name, John Lee Smith, is an example of direct naming. But what about a slightly shortened version of
his name, like John L. Smith? Under most circumstances, the slightly
shortened version of the name would be just as “direct” for the purposes of incrimination; although, of course, one could imagine circumstances in which the use of an initial rather than the full middle
name would be significant, for example, where another individual,
with a name such as John Langford Smith, was involved in the case.
What about John Smith (middle initial unspecified)? What about J.
Smith? What about J. S.? Is this still “direct” enough, or have we now
officially entered onto what Scalia calls “the path of inference”? The
answer that contextualism gives is that we entered onto the path of
inference for all versions of the names, although we drew some of the
inferences so quickly and unselfconsciously that we did not notice we
were making them at all.
Recognizing the inescapability of context even in instances of “direct” naming does not, however, entail giving up on the idea of obvious inferences. Contextualism recognizes that there are different
types and degrees of inferences, and acknowledges that a jury might
find some inferences more obvious than others given a certain set of
background facts. But Richardson’s “facially incriminating” standard
seeks to do more than just distinguish between more or less obvious
inferences that a jury can draw from a confession. Richardson seeks to
draw a hard theoretical line between incrimination that a jury realizes
through inferences and those that it receives without the use of inferences. And on the basis of this hard theoretical line, Richardson advances a quasi-psychological argument to justify limiting Bruton to
instances in which the defendant is “facially incriminated.” Richardson
argues that for incrimination which the jury arrives at inferentially,
145. As discussed later in Part III.E.3, in his dissent to Gray, Scalia himself acknowledges this point in the course of attacking the Gray majority’s finding that deletion redaction as a class is facially incriminating. Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185, 201–02 (1998).
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limiting instructions can dissuade the jury “from entering onto the
path of inference in the first place, so that there is no incrimination to
forget.”146 But if one rejects the idea that direct naming is a special
category of inference-free incrimination, one can appreciate that
Bruton issues involve a spectrum of incriminating inferences, ranging
from ones that are obvious and grasped almost immediately to those
that are complex and might only be realized after a fair amount of
information has been absorbed by the jury over the course of a trial.
If one acknowledges the essential role that contextual information plays in a jury’s interpretation of whether a confession is incriminating to a defendant, then Richardson’s psychological distinctions
appear all the more dubious.147 Richardson argues that a jury has the
most trouble following a limiting instruction in instances of direct
naming because direct naming is “more vivid than inferential incrimination, and hence more difficult to thrust out of mind.”148 But nondirect-naming instances of incrimination present the opposite problem; the jury may make the incriminating inference without being
aware of doing so in the first place.149 Jurors by the very nature of the
role given them must assimilate vast amounts of discrete information
into a whole. At trial, a large body of background information is built
up across time as evidence is presented, and it can become extremely
hard for the jurors to trace and segregate the inferences that emerge
from the various sources of information—which is what they would
have to do to follow the limiting instruction.
Even prosecutors, who, as lawyers, are specifically trained in segregating inferences based on the law of evidence, can have problems
in segregating the information obtained in a Bruton redacted confession and can inadvertently and impermissibly use such information

146. Richardson, 481 U.S. at 208.
147. Richardson does not point to any empirical research in psychology to support its
presuppositions about when a jury is more or less likely to follow a limiting instruction. For
a discussion of how courts create rules based on factual presuppositions, despite the fact
that such presuppositions have not been established by empirical research, see Peter J.
Smith, New Legal Fictions, 95 GEO. L.J. 1435 (2007).
148. Richardson, 481 U.S. at 208.
149. Ritter makes a related point:
The jury’s natural inclination to figure out the identity of “another” could not be
deterred by the limiting instruction because it would not be until after making
the link to Marsh that the jury would even realize that the confession described
the actions of the defendant against whom it was not to be considered.
Ritter, supra note 7, at 886.

R
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against the non-confessor defendant.150 Notably, the prosecutor in
Richardson made this very mistake. In his closing argument, although
he started by admonishing the jury not to use William’s confession
against Marsh, he later did so himself by linking Marsh to the portion
of Williams’ confession describing his conversation with Martin in the
car.151
The prosecutor’s mistake, however, was quite understandable.
Marsh’s own testimony, in effect, highlighted the importance of the
conversation in the car described in Williams’ confession. Marsh
stated that she rode in the car with Martin and Williams and acknowledged she knew that the two were talking, but stated she could not
hear their conversation over the sound of the radio.152 The jury might
wonder why Marsh would bother to mention a conversation she
claimed she could not hear unless the asserted fact of her not hearing
it was somehow relevant to her defense. In fact, the content of the
conversation in the car described in the Williams’ confession provided
an explanation of why Marsh would testify that she had not heard it;
the conversation gave her notice of the plan to rob and kill the victims
and, therefore, contradicted her defense that she thought the visit to
Scott was merely to ask for a loan.
Conceptually, Williams’ confession filled in a question raised by
Marsh’s own testimony. Legally, however, neither the jury nor the
prosecutor was allowed to use any part of Williams’ confession against
Marsh. Psychologically, it would have taken a superhuman effort to
segregate the inferences arising from the confession, as the prosecutor’s own error illustrates. But the power of these inferences was not
based on “facial incrimination.” The text of the confession had been
thoroughly redacted to remove all trace of Marsh. The power and corresponding inevitability of the inferences arose out of the contextual
relationships between the various bits of evidence raised at trial, precisely the area that Richardson’s facially incriminating standard would
exclude from Bruton analysis.
D. Between Richardson and Gray
Although Richardson introduced the “facially incriminating” standard, it left unclear the exact relationship between several conceptual
150. See, e.g., People v. Lewis, 181 P.3d 947, 984 (Cal. 2008) (where the prosecutor, in
closing argument, relied heavily on confessor codefendant’s statement in establishing guilt
of non-confessor codefendant).
151. Richardson, 481 U.S. at 205.
152. Id. at 204.
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issues implicated by the standard. Facial incrimination in Richardson
raises at least the following four concepts: (1) presence of a signifier
pointing to the defendant within the four corners of the text; (2) direct naming as a class of inherently incriminating descriptions; (3)
“immediately” apparent textual incrimination; and (4) exclusion of
consideration of other evidence introduced at trial. In Richardson, because of the peculiar nature of its facts, all of these concepts were
aligned. Because any mention of defendant Marsh was completely removed from the confession, there was no signifier in the text pointing
to her. Therefore, there was also no direct naming and no immediately apparent textual incrimination. On the basis of this, Richardson
justified the exclusion of the consideration of other evidence introduced at trial. However, other types of redacted confessions involve
different relationships between the concepts implicated by Richardson’s facially incriminating standard. Unlike the “complete” redaction
involved in Richardson, most Bruton issues facing courts involve what
has come to be called “partial redaction” confessions; that is, the defendant’s presence and actions are indicated by signifiers in the redacted confession, but the defendant is not directly named. The
defendant’s name is redacted to conceal his or her identity by the use
of symbols such as “X” and “____,” blank spaces, and, most commonly,
pronouns and descriptions such as “another,” “friend,” “they,” or
“someone.”153 After Richardson, courts adopted different approaches
to partial redaction cases.154 Some extended the facially incriminating
standard of Richardson to partial redaction cases and held that if the
defendant is not directly named in the confession, but rather is only
referred to via a symbol or redacted expression, there is no violation
of Bruton.155 Such an approach, of course, is the most egregious use of
formalism to ignore contextual meaning. At least in Richardson, there
was no signifier in the text of the confession pointing an accusing
finger at the defendant, even though other contextual information at
trial allowed the jury to figure out that Marsh was incriminated by the
confession. In the case of a partially redacted confession, however,
there is a signifier in the text pointing to someone, and thus it is all
153. Ritter, supra note 7, at 884 nn.190–97 (listing cases for the types of partial redaction). A form of redaction halfway between complete and partial redaction is “passive voice
redaction,” in which the actions of the defendant are represented by the passive voice with
no actor attributed (e.g., “the victim was shot”). See People v. Lewis, 181 P.3d 947, 982–83
(Cal. 2008); People v. Archer, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 230, 236 (Ct. App. 2000).
154. My account of the period between Richardson and Gray draws on the excellent
account in Ritter, supra note 7, at 883–912.
155. See id. at 882–98 and the cases cited therein.

R

R
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the more likely that the jury will use contextual information introduced at trial to adduce that someone is the defendant. Furthermore,
often the very form of the redaction—such as an obviously blanked
out word or an “X”—alerts the jury that something is being hidden
from them, which increases the possibility they will draw the inference
that the concealed individual is the defendant.
After Richardson, two approaches emerged for determining how a
partially redacted confession could still be incriminating to a defendant.156 First was the “degree of inference” test, which evaluated how
likely it was that the jury would, in light of the evidence that was expected to be admitted at trial, infer that the defendant was the person
indicated by the redacted expression in the confession.157 This test
uses contextual analysis, but it uses it prospectively to evaluate the possible risk, and thus is meant to allow a court to make pretrial determinations of admissibility.158 The second approach was dubbed the
“invitation to speculate” test.159 For many courts, this test focused on
whether the form of the redaction itself, such as a blank space or “X,”
was likely to convey to the jury that names of known accomplices were
intentionally being concealed.160 Unlike the “degree of inference
test,” the “invitation to speculate” test does not take into account
other contextual evidence that might link the defendant to the redacted confession.161 In the words of one commentator, it is only concerned with excluding confessions redacted in such a way that they
“entice the jury to try to solve the mystery.”162
The “invitation to speculate” test is a type of textual formalist
analysis. It involves a close scrutiny of the redacted confession that
parallels a New Critical close reading of a literary text. Just as a New
Critical close reading scrutinized literary texts for their internal tensions and contradictions, an invitation to speculate analysis also scruti156. Id. at 899–900.
157. See id. at 900–08 and the cases cited therein. People v. Fletcher, 917 P.2d 187, 196
(Cal. 1996) (presenting a typical formulation: “[R]edaction that replaces the
nondeclarant’s name with a pronoun or similar neutral . . . term will adequately safeguard
the nondeclarant’s confrontation rights unless the average juror . . . could not avoid drawing the inference that the nondeclarant is the person so designated in the confession
. . . .”). “[T]he sufficiency of this form of editing must be determined on a case-by-case
basis in light of the statement [the redacted confession] as a whole and the other evidence
presented at the trial.” Id. at 197.
158. See Ritter, supra note 7, at 900–08 and the cases cited therein.
159. Id. at 908–12.
160. Id. at 908.
161. Id. at 910.
162. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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nizes the redacted confession for any internal features that might
signal to the jury that the text has been redacted. These indications in
the text might be relatively subtle, such as ungrammatical sentences
resulting from the redaction,163 or they might be obvious, such as the
use of an “X” or an obvious blank space for the defendant’s name.
The latter is the type of redaction dealt with in Gray.
The “invitation to speculate” analysis therefore complements the
Richardson facial incrimination standard in several ways. Richardson
based the presumed success of a limiting instruction on its being able
to prevent the jury from “entering onto the path of inference in the
first place.”164 The invitation to speculate test makes an assessment of
this necessary precondition; that is, it analyzes the extent to which the
form of the redacted confession itself encourages the jury to enter
onto the path of inference. As with the facial incriminating standard
of Richardson, the “invitation to speculate” test has the apparent advantage of being easily applicable pretrial because it entails only an analysis of the form of the text, not consideration of other evidence that
might be introduced at trial.
In Gray, the Supreme Court used “invitation to speculate” analysis
to support its holding that blank space redaction violates Bruton.165 As
I will discuss below, although “invitation to speculate” analysis is a useful supplement to Richardson’s restrictive facial incrimination standard, “invitation to speculate” analysis remains within the artificial
boundaries of the textual formalism defined by Richardson.
E. Gray v. Maryland
1. Facts and Holding
Defendant Kevin Gray and codefendant Anthony Bell were jointly
tried for murder.166 Bell had given a confession to the police in which
he stated that he, Gray, and another individual, Jacquin Vanlandingham, had participated in the beating that resulted in the victim’s
death.167 The trial judge admitted a redacted version of Bell’s confession into evidence. In this redacted version, the police detective who
read the confession into evidence said the word “deleted” or “dele163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

See People v. Archer, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 230 (Ct. App. 2000).
Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 208 (1987).
See infra Part III.E.2.
Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185, 188 (1998).
Id. (Vanlandingham died before he could be tried).
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tion” whenever Gray’s or Vanlandingham’s name appeared.168 A written copy of the confession was also introduced into evidence with the
two names omitted, leaving in their place blank white spaces separated by commas.169 Gray testified and denied participating in the
beating.170 Bell did not testify.171 The jury was instructed that the confession was only evidence against Bell, and that it should not be used
against Gray.172 The jury convicted both Bell and Gray, and Gray appealed.173 Maryland’s intermediate appellate court overturned Gray’s
conviction, but Maryland’s highest court reinstated it.174 The United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider Bruton’s application to redactions using an obvious blank space or symbol or words
such as “deleted.”175
Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Stevens, O’Connor, Souter, and
Ginsberg, concluded that the admission of Gray’s edited statement violated Bruton for the following reason:
Redactions that simply replace a name with an obvious blank
space or a word such as “deleted” or a symbol or other similarly
obvious indications of alteration . . . leave statements that, considered as a class, so closely resemble Bruton’s unredacted statements
that . . . the law must require the same result.176

The Gray majority noted that “an obvious blank will not likely fool
anyone.”177 A juror who wonders to whom the blank space in the codefendant’s confession might refer “need only lift his eyes” to see the
defendant sitting at his table with his attorney “to find what will seem
the obvious answer.”178 Gray noted that the judge’s instruction not to
consider the confession against the defendant can itself encourage a
168. Id. Immediately after the police detective read the redacted confession to the jury,
the prosecutor asked, “after he gave you that information, you subsequently were able to
arrest Mr. Kevin Gray; is that correct?” Id. at 188–89. The officer responded, “That’s correct.” Id. at 189. Thus, as in Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200 (1987), whatever the merits
of the prosecution’s attempts at redaction, the prosecutor himself let the cat out of the bag
by “blatantly link[ing] the defendant to the deleted name.” Gray, 523 U.S. at 193. But,
while the prosecutor’s own remarks here arguably provided an independent ground for
reversing the conviction, Gray went on to consider the validity of the redaction technique
itself to settle the issue. Id.
169. Gray, 523 U.S. at 189.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 192.
177. Id. at 193.
178. Id.
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juror to conclude that the defendant is the person blanked out in the
confession.179 Gray also remarked how the form of the redaction can
contribute to prejudice against the defendant: “[T]he obvious deletion may well call the jurors’ attention specially to the removed name.
By encouraging the jury to speculate about the reference, the redaction may overemphasize the importance of the confession’s accusation—once the jurors work out the reference.”180
Gray concluded that Richardson was not controlling here.181 Gray
conceded that “Richardson placed outside the scope of Bruton’s rule
those statements that incriminate inferentially,” and that Gray’s jury
would have had to use inference to connect the statement in the redacted confession with Gray.182 But Gray concluded that the critical
difference was not “inference pure and simple,” but rather “the kind
of . . . inference.”183 If all inference were prohibited, Gray notes, Richardson “would also place outside Bruton’s scope confessions that use
shortened first names, nicknames, descriptions as unique as the ‘redhaired, bearded, one-eyed man-with-a-limp,’ [ ] and perhaps even full
names of defendants who are always known by a nickname.”184 Gray
rejected this application of Richardson on the grounds that the Supreme Court had always assumed that nicknames and specific descriptions fell within Bruton’s protections.185
Having rejected the proposition that Richardson categorically prohibited the consideration of any type of inference in determining
prejudice under Bruton, Gray distinguished the types of inference involved in the present case: “[T]he inferences at issue here involve
statements that, despite redaction, obviously refer directly to someone, often obviously the defendant, and which involve inferences that
a jury ordinarily could make immediately, even were the confession
the very first item introduced at trial.”186 Gray concluded that “the
redacted confession with the blank prominent on its face, in Richardson’s words, ‘facially incriminat[es]’ the codefendant.”187
Justice Scalia authored a dissent—joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Kennedy and Thomas—in which he criticized the
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

(using a version of the “invitation to speculate” test).
at 195.
at 195–96.
at 195 (internal citations omitted).
at 196.
(citing Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 209 (1987)).
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Gray majority for “struggl[ing] to decide whether a confession redacted to omit the defendant’s name is incriminating on its face or by
inference.”188 Scalia pointed to the apparent contradiction between
the Gray majority’s initial assertion that “the jury must use inference to
connect the statement in this redacted confession with the defendant,” and its later assertion that “the redacted confession with the
blank prominent on its face . . . ‘facially incriminates’ him.”189
2. Inferences and Contextualism
Gray acknowledges that Bruton is violated when it is obvious that a
jury will figure out the identity of a defendant even though—and, perhaps, because—his name has been redacted by blank spaces. But contextualism shows us that obviousness cannot be determined solely by
the textual features of the redacted confession, which was the basic
fallacy adopted by Richardson. In Richardson, with its odd set of facts—
there was no textual trace of the defendant in the confession—Scalia
made the facial incrimination standard seem plausible and rejected
contextualist analysis. However, in Gray, the artificiality of Scalia’s textualism in Richardson became apparent because the incrimination to
defendant Gray from the redacted confession was obvious, notwithstanding that Scalia was correct in his dissent that the defendant in
Gray was not “facially incriminated,” in the way Richardson had meant.
In effect, the Gray majority rejected the absurdity of a facial incrimination standard that would ignore immediate and obvious incriminating inferences. It acknowledged that it was not the act of
inference itself but the type of inference that makes the difference.190
In the end, however, Gray retained the facial incrimination standard
and rejected the necessity of considering other evidence presented at
trial.191 The consequence has been that the Gray majority made what
appear to be ad hoc distinctions between the types of information
outside the face of the confession that a court must consider for incriminating inferences. Gray appears to acknowledge the relevance of
any information outside the face of the text, as long as it is not evidence to be produced at trial, and as long as the incriminating inference based on it is evident before any evidence is produced at trial.192
However, by acknowledging the inescapability of inference, but not
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

Id. at 201.
Id.
Gray, 523 U.S. at 195–96.
Id.
Id.
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embracing the full consequences of that acknowledgement, Gray left
Bruton law in its current state of theoretical conflict and confusion.
The Gray majority acknowledged that blank spaces used to redact
the confession at issue in Gray were incriminating because they invited
the jury to speculate about what had been omitted.193 The Court
therefore accepted the “invitation to speculate” test as a legitimate extension of Richardson’s “facial incrimination” standard. In doing so,
the Court followed the same formalistic method of New Criticism in
scrutinizing a literary text for tensions and contradictions and then
considering these tensions or contradictions in determining the text’s
meaning.194 The blank spaces discussed in Gray express a meaning to
the reader, namely that the confession had been altered, and that
some name had been omitted. While the blank spaces themselves are
within the four corners of the text, the meaning those blank spaces
point to are based on information outside of the text, namely the
identity of the person concealed by the blank space. Because the identity of the redacted defendant is outside the four corners of the text,
Gray acknowledged the incrimination caused by the blank spaces was
based on an “inference.”195
The word “inference” as used by Gray is conceptually the same as
the word “context” as it has been used in literary and legal hermeneutical theory. To make an inference is to use facts to reach a conclusion
through inductive reasoning. As discussed above, this is the same process by which a reader uses context to determine meaning in interpreting a text.196 Context is the background set of facts and
presuppositions through which the reader determines one meaning
out of a range of possible meanings. The inferences Gray describes are
part of the process of contextualization by which the jury would find
meaning in the confession presented to it, or, more specifically, understand the confession to be incriminating to the defendant. As Gray
described it, because of certain facts known to the jurors—that two
codefendants are sitting before them in court—the jurors are able to
draw inferences about the identity of the redacted party in the confession—that the blanked out name refers to the non-confessor
codefendant.197
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

Id. at 193.
See supra Part II.B.
Gray, 523 U.S. at 195.
See supra Part II.C.
Gray, 523 U.S. at 193.
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When one regards the evolution of Bruton doctrine from Richardson to Gray, one can see how it illustrates a crisis of textual formalism
that is similar to the one discussed above in the movement from New
Criticism to Deconstruction. New Critical readings of a text revealed
internal tensions or ambiguities in the text, which, in turn, led to multiple interpretations.198 Some Deconstructionist critics celebrated the
multiplicity of readings for revealing the essential ambiguity of
texts.199 In order to make the case that one reading is correct and
another incorrect, however, the interpreter cannot simply continue to
point to the face of the text. In order to support one interpretation
over another, the interpreter has to describe the background contexts
that give rise to one meaning over another and then argue that one
specified context is more plausible or convincing than the other.
In the evolution of Bruton doctrine, the need to move beyond the
face of the text was triggered by an even more explicit crisis. Richardson had fixed the scrutiny of the confession to the face of the text. But,
with the use of blank space redaction as a technique, a scrutiny of the
face of the text itself led the jurors to infer that something was missing. In the redacted confession under consideration in Gray, the blank
spaces themselves indicated that a hidden meaning of this text was
based on information outside the text.
3. Scalia’s Dissent
Scalia’s dissent addresses the central contradiction in Gray,
namely, that while Gray purports to retain Richardson’s “facial incrimination” standard, it expands its scope to include inferences based on
information beyond the face of the confession. However, in criticizing
the Gray majority’s apparently contradictory use of Richardson’s facial
incrimination standard, Scalia raises the fundamental theoretical
problem with the concept of facial incrimination itself.
Scalia analyzes and criticizes the Gray majority’s use of examples
of facially incriminating descriptions—the “red-haired, bearded, oneeyed man-with-a-limp” and “Me, Kevin Gray, and a few other guys.”200
He argues that these descriptions would be facially incriminating, that
is to say, incriminating without reference to evidence introduced at
trial, only under certain circumstances, and that, under other circumstances, these same descriptions would be incriminating only in com198. See supra Part II.B.
199. See de Man, supra note 68.
200. Gray, 523 U.S. at 200–02.

R
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bination with evidence introduced at trial.201 The jury would
immediately find the description, “red-haired, bearded, one-eyed
man-with-a-limp,” incriminating if the defendant had not changed his
appearance prior to trial.202 However, under different circumstances,
namely, when the defendant changed his appearance prior to trial by
dying his hair black and shaving off his beard, the jury would not find
the description incriminating unless the jury possessed additional contextual information, such as evidence introduced at trial describing
his former appearance.203 Similarly, a confession listing “Me, Kevin
Gray, and a few other guys” would facially incriminate Kevin Gray only
if the name “Kevin Gray” was used in the indictment.204 But if the
defendant’s name as set forth in the indictment was not “Kevin Gray,”
then, in order for the jurors to find the name incriminating, they
would have to be given the information that defendant sometimes
used “Kevin Gray” as an alias.205
Scalia goes on to contrast the blank redaction technique used in
Gray’s case with the specific descriptions and direct names he has just
analyzed. As he argued, direct names and specific descriptions could,
under some, but not all circumstances, be immediately incriminating
without reference to evidence introduced at trial.206 But, he notes,
“the person to whom ‘deleted’ refers in ‘Me, deleted, deleted, and a
few other guys’ is not apparent from anything the jury knows independent of the evidence at trial.”207 Just like the deletion technique used
in “Me, deleted, deleted, and a few other guys,” the blank redaction
technique used in Gray’s case leaves it unclear as to whom the blank
refers. Scalia acknowledges the jury may speculate about the redacted
reference.208 However, he asserts that this speculation is not “so powerful” that “we must depart from the normal presumption that the
jury follows its [limiting] instructions.”209
Scalia’s point is to undercut the Gray majority’s examples of facial
incrimination. Ironically, however, in doing so, Scalia engages in precisely the type of contextualist critique that can be turned against the
whole concept of facial incrimination itself. Scalia’s assertion in the
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 202.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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dissent that the facial incrimination of direct names depends on circumstances is particularly damaging to the arguments he made in
Richardson to justify the facial incrimination standard. There, Scalia
distinguished direct naming as a category of expression that a jury
would find to be facially incriminating, that is, the jury would find it to
be incriminating immediately and without the use of inference.210
While Richardson did not expressly state that direct naming was the
only category that produced facial incrimination, direct naming and
facial incrimination are essentially used interchangeably.211 In Richardson, Scalia purported to present a principled argument for reserving
Bruton for instances of direct naming because limiting instructions
have no effect on direct naming because it is an inference-free form of
incrimination.212 In contrast, he argued, limiting instructions would
be adequate for incrimination arrived at through inference.213
In seeming contradiction to Richardson, Scalia acknowledges
through his “Me, Kevin Gray, and a few other guys” example in the
Gray dissent, that, even for instances of direct naming, context determines incrimination. It is not the form of the expression as a direct
name but the whole background context that produces incrimination.
If context always determines incrimination, even in the case of a direct name, then the sharp theoretical line that Richardson draws between facial and non-facial incrimination disappears. If not even
direct naming is “facially incriminating,” in Richardson’s sense of inference-free incrimination, then what is? The answer, contextualism tells
us, is that no category of expression is facially incriminating as a form.
Richardson’s argument for the facial incrimination standard is therefore self-contradictory.
Scalia’s dissent does not address how to reconcile his contextualist critiques of the Gray majority with his earlier arguments in Richardson about facial incrimination. That is the prerogative of Scalia’s
dissent, whose goal is to raise problems in the majority opinion, rather
than present solutions to the conceptual problems raised by Richardson’s facial incrimination standard. However, as discussed below, the
Gray majority itself failed to explain its apparently contradictory position that Richardson’s facial incrimination standard could apply to incriminating inferences based on information outside the face of the
text.
210.
211.
212.
213.

See supra Part III.C.2.
Id.
Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 208 (1987).
Id.
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4. Revisiting Contextual Analysis
The Gray majority expanded the definition of facial incrimination
to include “statements that, despite redaction, obviously refer directly
to someone, often obviously the defendant, and which involve inferences that a jury ordinarily could make immediately, even were the
confession the very first item introduced at trial.”214 What Gray sees as
giving rise to these immediate and obvious incriminating inferences is
a combination of textual features and information outside the face of
the text. The incriminating textual feature of the confession in Gray
was the blank space redaction itself, which was an “obvious deletion”
that “may well call the jurors’ attention specially to the removed
name.”215 The main bit of non-textual incriminating information was
the presence of the defendant in the courtroom, along with his codefendant the confessor. The judge’s limiting instruction not to consider the confession against the defendant also provided an additional
piece of non-textual incriminating information because “that instruction will provide an obvious reason for the blank.”216
Gray does not provide guidance as to how a court should determine whether an inference is “immediate.” The more fundamental
problem, however, is that “immediate” in Gray implies two senses of
the word, and the majority opinion in Gray relies on both senses of the
word to make its position persuasive. But the two senses of the word
“immediate” are not always present in every Bruton situation. In its first
sense, an “immediate” inference is an empirically obvious inference;
that is, one that any reasonable person, given the same information,
would draw. In its second sense, immediate inference means one arrived at first in time; that is, arrived at quickly. Of course, these two
senses, the empirical and the temporal, often go together; inferences
that are empirically obvious are often quickly drawn by people.
Nevertheless, the process of a criminal trial complicates the relationship between the empirical and the temporal senses of an “immediate inference.” In a criminal trial, the jury is given information
throughout the course of the trial. Jurors have, of course, significantly
more information at the end of the trial—when they have heard all
the evidence—than they do at the beginning—when no evidence has
been presented. After they have heard some or all of the evidence
presented at trial, certain inferences, such as the identity of the per214. Gray, 523 U.S. at 196.
215. Id. at 193.
216. Id.
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son behind a redacted name in the confession, may well appear obvious. Jurors may arrive at this conclusion immediately upon being
given the relevant pieces of information at trial. But this moment may
come late in the temporal process of the trial.
Gray defines “immediate” inferences as those that take place at a
certain early point in the temporal process of the trial, namely, those
“that a jury ordinarily could make . . . even were the confession the
very first item introduced at trial.”217 Thus, the incriminating inferences discussed in Gray are immediate in both the temporal and empirical senses of the word. These inferences are so obvious that they
would be immediately grasped even if the confession were the very
first item introduced at trial. However, there might be inferences that
would be no less empirically obvious to the jury, but that the jury
would not make until other evidence was introduced at trial. When
that evidence is introduced, these inferences may well be grasped “immediately,” that is in the sense of being obviously apparent. But
chronologically they will come later in the trial, and, therefore, will
not be “immediate” in the temporal sense that Gray also demands.
The Gray majority gives no reason why inferences that will appear
obvious after evidence is presented at trial should be considered less
“immediate” than those whose obviousness can be grasped before any
evidence, other than the confession, is introduced at trial. Richardson
at least purported to present a principled argument for limiting “immediate” inferences to the face of the text.218 Richardson argued that
incrimination could be determined from the face of the text itself,
and thus there was no need to consider any other information, let
alone evidence produced at trial.219 In contrast, Gray allows consideration of information outside the face of the text—i.e., the fact of the
defendant sitting in front of them, the judge’s limiting instruction,
etc.—but draws the line at evidence introduced at trial.220 Given
Gray’s acknowledgement of the inescapable role that inference plays
in determining incrimination, this line drawing appears artificial, arbitrary, and certainly does not correspond to the actual duties of the
jury, which is to consider all the evidence at trial in relation to each
other and make a final determination of fact.221
217. Id. at 196.
218. See supra Part III.C.2.
219. See id.
220. See supra Part III.E.2.
221. See, e.g., the following excerpts from the California Criminal Jury Instructions:
“As jurors, you may discuss the case together only after all of the evidence has been presented
. . . .” CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CRIMINAL 101 (2008) [hereinafter CALCRIM] (em-
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Gray’s exclusion of the consideration of other evidence offered at
trial appears to arise out of the desire to preserve, at all costs, the
procedural simplicity that Richardson’s facial incrimination standard
provides for allowing the trial court to consider the admissibility of a
redacted confession through a pretrial motion. Richardson pointed out
that a procedural difficulty with contextual implication analysis was
that it “would presumably require the trial judge to assess at the end
of each trial whether, in light of all the evidence, a nontestifying codefendant’s confession has been so ‘powerfully incriminating’ that a
new, separate trial is required for the defendant.”222 But procedural
considerations should follow the determination of the proper constitutional standard, not vice versa. Furthermore, there have been various plausible proposals for how a trial court could consider a pretrial
Bruton motion in relation to evidence presented at trial. The Richardson dissent proposed one solution: “In most such cases the trial judge
can comply with the dictates of Bruton by postponing his or her decision on the admissibility of the confession until the prosecution rests,
at which time its potentially inculpatory effect can be evaluated in
light of the government’s entire case.”223 However, even the more
modest proposal of having the trial court consider the major evidence
anticipated to be presented at trial in connection with a Bruton motion would prevent the most egregious effects of the facial incrimination standard. The Richardson majority acknowledged that a good deal
of the possible prejudice could be foreseen if the trial court conducted a pretrial hearing at which the prosecutor and defense could
indicate how evidence they plan to introduce would bear on the redacted confession that was being proposed for admission.224 Admittedly, such anticipation of the evidence is, in the words of the
Richardson majority, “far from foolproof.”225 But given the current
phasis added); “In deciding whether the People have proved their case beyond a reasonable doubt, you must impartially compare and consider all the evidence that was received
throughout the entire trial.” CALCRIM 103.
222. Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 209 (1987).
223. Id. at 220 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
224. Id. at 209.
225. Id. Ritter, who otherwise criticizes Richardson, argues it is too difficult to assess
pretrial the likelihood the redaction will be unmasked during the course of the trial. Ritter,
supra note 7, at 916. Her solution is to call for a per se rule of exclusion of the confession
where there is the possibility that the redaction could be uncovered. Id. I agree that such a
rule would prevent any possible prejudice to the defendant. However, I think that such a
rule would require a radical revision in Bruton law; whereas consideration of anticipated
evidence is a more modest change that would allow the courts to continue their current
individualized assessment of prejudice, while acknowledging relevant contextual
information.

R
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state of Bruton law, consideration of evidence anticipated at trial
would be a step forward in acknowledging contextualism in Bruton
analysis.

Conclusion
The theoretical issue discussed in this Article is returning a sense
of analytical clarity to Bruton analysis. As this Article has argued, contextualism is the central insight of both modern literary and legal hermeneutics. Contextualism shows us that all meaning is determined by
context, and that all context is potentially relevant. Bruton analysis
therefore should consider all relevant contextual information that
might contribute to the jury’s understanding of the confession, including information presented at trial.
Richardson sought to enshrine a strict textualist standard of meaning for the analysis of Bruton prejudice, in effect limiting Bruton’s application to cases where the full form of the defendant’s name was
found within the “four corners” of the text, and thus “facially incriminated” the defendant. The unique facts behind Richardson—defendant was not referred to at all in the confession—masked the
contradictions of this extreme textualist approach. In Gray, the Supreme Court decided a case with facts more typical of the Bruton redaction problem faced by courts, namely, the confession referred to
the defendant but was redacted to conceal his name. Gray ultimately
rejected Richardson’s extreme form of textualism and recognized that
an analysis of the prejudice to a defendant does not depend only on
the form of the defendant’s name used in the confession, but rather
on the inferences that a jury could draw from the confession, even if a
defendant’s name were formally redacted.226
Gray acknowledged that assessing a Bruton violation depends on
“the kind of, not the simple fact of, inference,”227 but Gray did not
present a principled reason for the limited body of materials from
which it allowed inferences.228 Thus, while Gray acknowledged the essential role of context in determining meaning, it ultimately retained
much of Richardson’s textual formalism, including the “facially incriminating” standard, and the refusal to consider contextual information
from other evidence presented at trial.229 The result has been the continuation of a contradictory standard of “facial incrimination,” which
226.
227.
228.
229.

See supra Part III.E.2.
Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185, 195–96 (1998).
See supra Part III.E.4.
See supra Part III.E.2.
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allows a consideration of some information outside of the “face” of
the confession, but which draws apparently arbitrary distinctions concerning the types of contextual information a court must consider. A
complete rejection of textual formalism is necessary in order to restore any coherence to Bruton analysis.
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